In McCoy v. Louisiana , 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), this Court held the Sixth Amendment grants a right of autonomy that precludes criminal defendants' lawyers from overrriding their clients' express desire to maintain innoce nce. Raymond Johnson's charg es included two counts of arson felony-murder, and one count of first degree arson of a building/structure. Johnson 1) alleged he was coerced into making his confession, 2) told his lawyers at all times that he did not commit the crimes, and 3) insisted expressly on going forward and fully contesting guilt. In his opening statement, counsel presented an argument pointedly concluding that Johnson did not intend to kill one of the two victims of the fire. On post-conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) considered the three bases for retroactivity in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 (1989), determined McCoy is not retroactive, and also held McCoy inapplicable because counsel's concession of guilt was not overt or complete.

The questions presented are:

1. Does McCoy apply retroactively? Specifically:
a. Did McCoy establis h a new rule of constitutional law under the framework of Teague v. Lane ,? And if so,
b. Is the rule of McCoy retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review as a "substantive rule" under the framework of Teague ?
c. Is the rule of McCoy retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review as a "watershed rule" under the framework of Teague ?

2. How overt and complete must a concession of guilt be under McCoy ?

Does McCoy apply retroactively?