Are New York State's criminal appellate procedures deficient, and/or prejudicial to a criminal defendant's due process, equal protection and/or state-granted right to appeal when the state appellate procedures require that factual challenges to the conviction precede a direct appeal by a post-conviction motion, and the sentencing judge advises a defendant of his right to appeal but not the right to a factual challenge via the post-conviction motion such that the Petitioner should be granted a new appeal?

I. Did Appellate Counsel's failure to expand the record prior to filing an appeal deprive the Petitioner of effective assistance of counsel, and did New York State Courts inhospitably deny Petitioner his right to appeal when state law and procedures unduly complicate the right to appeal a criminal conviction by relegating factual challenges to the post-conviction motion, such that Petitioner is entitled to a new appeal?

II. Did the New York State courts inhospitably withhold from the Petitioner the presumptions of correctness due him by federal law, and/or otherwise unreasonably deny the Petitioner due process and/or his right to appeal by denying his petition for a writ of error seeking to vacate his appeal denial and proceed first with a motion to expand the record that ineffective appellate counsel denied him, such that Petitioner is entitled to a new appeal with the opportunity to first expand the record?

III. Are New York State's appellate procedures, as written or as applied, inadequate or ineffective to protect and safeguard a criminal defendant's right to appeal and/or due process or equal protection when, as here, the state court refused to deploy its statutory fact-finding authority/discretion to consider the Petitioner's timely filed and served pro se supplemental brief and/or failed to investigate its factual contentions that the appeal was proceeding on "errors and omissions," such that the Petitioner should be granted a new appeal and/or in keeping with state precedent that a hearing be held to determine if a new trial should be ordered?

IV. Did Respondent State's appellate court commit constitutional injury to the Petitioner and/or abuse its discretion to make factual findings when it irrationally affirmed the verdict and ex post facto superimposed its three-years-after-the-fact reasoning to cure a fatal defect in the trial transcript instead of ordering a new trial, such that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial and/or new appeal?

V. such testimony) should be overturned and/or are the Respondent State's appellate court's failures to evaluate the harmful effects of such testimony in Petitioner's trial as required by federal law grounds to order a new appeal for the Petitioner?

VI. Was Petitioner's claims to ineffective trial counsel and ineffective appellate counsel denied him to a new appeal, and/or is New York State's preference for its own distinctive state standard for evaluating ineffective claims to the exclusion of the federal STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON standard delaying the detection of ineffective counsel and also thereby withholding meaningful appellate review to criminal appellants in violation of the Constitution's guarantees to due process, equal protection, and in prolonging cruel and unusual punishment if wrongfully convicted as a result of ineffective counsel such that federal habeas relief should be made available to criminal appellants even prior to the exhaustion of state remedies?

VII. Does a State's offer of the right of appeal to criminal defendants, as New York purports to do -- require that the state maintain procedures, processes, standards, presumptions of correctness, and effectiveness such that when a series of state failures to protect an appellant's appellate rights can

Are New York's criminal appellate procedures deficient or prejudicial to due process?