The circuit courts agree that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) will be sustained even if the defendant was not aware that his conduct would be perceived as intimidating by anyone, yet the Ninth Circuit has nevertheless determined that a conviction for violating § 2113(a) can serve as predicate offense for the substantial sentencing enhancements under § 924(c)(1). The question presented is whether reasonable jurists can debate whether a convic tion must necessarily establish that a defendant was more than negligent as to whether his intentional conduct could harm another before said conviction can serve as a predicate under § 924(c)(1) or whether, as the Ninth Circuit's analysis assumes, the limiting language "against the person of another" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c )(3)(A) is mere surplusage?

Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) can serve as a predicate offense for the substantial sentencing enhancements under § 924(c)(1)