I. The government concedes that one of the possible predicate offenses used to convict Petitioners under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) —conspiracy—is not a § 924(c) crime-of-violence predicate under United States v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). However, the federal circuits are split over the standa rd to apply when the § 924(c) predicate is ambiguous, i.e., where one possible pr edicate does not qua lify as a crime of violence and another possible predicate does . The Fourth Circuit holds the § 924(c) conviction must be vacated if one possibl e predicate offense does not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit holds the § 924(c) conviction remains valid if one possible predicate offense qua lifies as a crime of violence.

The question presented is whether an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction resting on more than one possible predicate offense is unconstitutional where at least one predicate does not qualify as a crime of violence.

II. Petitioners also ask this Court to address whether, to make federal armed bank robbery "fit" the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) crime-of-violence physical force clause definition, the Circuits interpret armed bank robbery too narrowly by requiring violent force as an element of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

Whether an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction resting on more than one possible predicate offense is unconstitutional where at least one predicate does not qualify as a crime of violence