1. The state habeas court in Petitioner's case issued a reasoned decision denying relief, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily affirmed. In Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018), this Court held that, under these precise circumstances, federal courts "should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale" and "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." The Eleventh Circuit paid mere lip service to this command. It instead largely ignored the unreasonably wrong legal and factual findings on which the state courts ruled, and rationalized the denial of relief with speculative reasons of its own creation. The Eleventh Circuit's dubious application of Wilson in this case is no outlier. Indeed, at least two other certiorari petitions currently before the Court from Eleventh Circuit decisions also present iterations of the same problem.

The question presented is whether the Eleventh Circuit should be allowed to flout this Court's clear instruction that § 2254(d) requires a federal court to "train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's claims" and "give appropriate deference to that decision." Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192 (emphasis added, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. As many, but not all, circuits have recognized, this Court's decisions indicate that the prejudicial impact of trial counsel's deficiencies must be assessed in the aggregate. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), requires courts to determine "whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors" (in the plural), "the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt," and, in capital cases, whether "absent the errors" (in the plural), it is reasonably probable that the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravation and mitigation did not warrant death. Id. at 695 (emphases added). At sentencing, courts must reweigh "the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding . . . against the evidence in aggravation." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000).

Did the Eleventh Circuit violate these precepts by:

a. Granting a certificate of appealability on only a portion of Petitioner's sentencing-ineffectiveness subclaims and denying the right to appeal the rest, thereby precluding any assessment of cumulative prejudice; and

b. Employing a piecemeal approach to the prejudice inquiry on the appealed subclaims and failing to assess their cumulative effect at sentencing?

Whether the Eleventh Circuit should be allowed to flout the Supreme Court's clear instruction in Wilson v. Sellers that federal courts must focus on the particular legal and factual reasons supporting the state court's rejection of a habeas petitioner's federal claims