I. Does the Eleventh Circuit's practice of applying published panel orders —issued in the context of an application for leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and decided in a truncated time frame without adversarial testing —as binding precedent in all subsequent appellate and collateral proceedings deprive inmates and criminal defendants of their right to due process, fundamental fairness, and meaningful review of the claims presented in their § 2255 motions and direct appeals?

II. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a predicate conviction for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" for purposes of the elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). However, as the history and text of the federal bank robbery statute make clear—and as prosecutions under the statute illustrate—section 2113(a) may be violated: (1) by unintended or otherwise accidental intimidation; or (2) by extortionate threats to economic interests alone. Given these circumstances, can the Eleventh Circuit's holding be reconciled with this Court's precedent in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)?

Does the Eleventh Circuit's practice of applying published panel orders as binding precedent deprive inmates of due process?