1. When applying the categorical approach, federal courts are "bound by" a state supreme court's "interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements" of the prior crime. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010); accord James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 205–206 (2007). Does "Taylor's demand for certainty" apply to federal courts' application and interpretation of state-court decisional law?

2. Where a state statute explicitly defines "burglary" in a way that does not require proof of an intent to commit a crime, and thus lacks an element necessary to satisfy Taylor's generic definition of "burglary," 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is that facial overbreadth enough to demonstrate that the crime is non-generic, or must a federal defendant also prove that the state has convicted someone who did not, in fact, harbor specific intent?

Whether the categorical approach requires federal courts to defer to a state supreme court's interpretation of state law when determining if a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act