Stephen Hugueley v. Tony Mays, Warden
In Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012) , this Court reaffirmed the right to
effective representation " is a bedrock principle in our justice system ." To ensure that
right is protected, this Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner establishes "cause"
to excuse a state procedural default by demonstrating that "appointed counsel in the
initial- review collateral proceeding, where the claim shoul d have been raised, was
ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668 (1984)."
Id. at 14.
Lower federal courts ' inconsistent application of Martinez , however, has
undermined this Court's clear instruction . First, the circuits differ on the types of
deficient representation in initial post-conviction proceedings that qualify as "cause ."
Some circuits, including the lower court here, limit the Martinez exception to cases
in which post -conviction counsel failed to plead a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Other courts apply Martinez to any deficient representation that result s in
a procedural default —including the failure to develop and present evidence in
support of such claims . Second, lower courts diverge in their trea tment of claim s that
differ from those raised by state post -conviction counsel . The Sixth Circuit and other
courts , apply a talismanic approach , precluding a Martinez inquiry of any unpled
Sixth Amendment claim w henever a Sixth Amendment claim was presented in state
court. Other courts employ well -established exhaustion principles to determine
whether the claim raised in federal court is the same claim presented to the state
courts .
These inconsistent application s of Martinez have creat ed splits among the
circuits and require this Court's clarification.
The question s presented are:
1. Does "cause" exist to excuse a procedural default when s tate post -conviction
counsel 's unreasonabl e and prejudicial fail ure to present any evidence to
support a claim " caused a procedural default in an initial -review collateral
proceeding ," Martinez , 566 U.S. at 14?
2. Whether the Martinez "cause" exception applies when post -conviction counsel
raised a Sixth Amendment claim, but failed to plead or present the specific
legal theory and facts of the distinct claim raised in federal court?
Does the Martinez exception apply when post-conviction counsel's deficient representation resulted in a procedural default?