Evatrus Derjuan Moss v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
COUNSEL ON AN INITIAL STATE POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATION, CONTRARY TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S PRECEDENT OF MARTINEZ v. RYAN, 566 U.S. 1, (2012) AND TREVINO v. THALER, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), ACTIVATE THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(B), WHEN THE STATE CREATED IMPEDIMENT CONTINUES TO EXIST?
2. DOES THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUITY PRINCIPLE OF HABEAS CORPUS AFFORD A PERSON PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ONE YEAR BAR OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS BEYOND THE FILING DATE DUE TO "PROCEDURAL DEFAULT?"
Does a denial of counsel on an initial state post-conviction habeas corpus application activate the exclusionary provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(B)