Do the Article 3, Section 2, Clause 3 provision, the "trial shall be held in the State where the said Crime shall have been committed" and the Sixth Amendment provision, the trial "in the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law," establishia;:,'--; tribunal that is part of the government structure and limit the district court's constitutional judicial power, Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1, to hear a criminal case?

Does 18 U.S.C. § 3232 limit the statutory judicial power, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, of the district court to hear a case?

Is 18 U.S.C. § 3237 a grant of jurisdiction, by Congress, to a district court, giving the judicial power to hear a case, for an offense committed within the district?

Can a defendant raise the issue of improper venue in a motion to dismiss for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and preserve the issue of improper venue for review on appeal?

Should the Appeal§ r Court have indulge a reasonable presumption against waiver, related to the issue of improper venue, and not presume acquiescence in the loss of a fundamental right?

Did the Government violate Due Process by providing inaccurate information in the venue argument, and did the Appeal he Court err when it reached it 3: decision based on the inaccurate information, when the correct information was in the "Statement of the Case" of the same brief by the Government?

Did the Appeals^ Court err when it relied on the "substantial contacts test" instead of "essential conduct elements" and the erroneous view of the statute 18 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) related to the meaning of an immediate family member, for finding that venue was proper in the Northern District of Ohio?

Does the Speedy Trial Act confine the discrebidnn of the district court as the Act mandates dismissal of the indictment upon violation of precise time limits? And should the Appeals Court indulge a reasonable presumption against waiver?

Did the Appeals Court err, when it did not consider the second Motion to Dismiss; First, when it relied on New Hampshire.v Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-51, (2001), to conclude that the argument was contradictory in the Appeliatit proceeding from the argument in the District Court? Second, when the Appeals Court claimed the Petitioner requested a continuance after the Superseding Indictment was filed?

Does the Speedy Trial Act require a defendant to articulate the period of time ' that: isr'.r.d uhexcluded at the time the motion is filed?

Did the Appeals Court err when it based its decision not to grant the Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, for improper service of the Temporary Protective Order, on 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5), which defines a protective order, instead of 18 U.S.C. § 2265, which provides jurisdiction to other States to enforce a protective order from another State?

Question not identified