1) When giving weight to the prejudice factor in a 'Barker' test & the complained of prejudice is the death of a DEFENSIVE witness, but the Court erroneously considers the witness to be a witness for the State (yet by the State's own admission and by the record it is shown the witness WAS a witness for the defense) was a fair ruling reached based on the factors of Barker vs. Wingo when the most important fact to be considered (if the deceased was a witness for the defense or prosecution) concerning the prejudice factor was actually contrary to the facts presented in the case?

2) Where Appellate Counsel is shown to be ineffective and likely the cause of the Court to consider the deceased as a witness for the State (because she proffered as fact , in error , that the witness was a witness for the State) and the record shows this to be in error, should a COA be granted Appellant so that ha may FAIRLY litigate this issue by way of a new Direct Appeal if the Court does not wish to re-perform the Barker test?

3) Should the State be given ANY favorable consideration in the prejudice factor because they chose to abandon extraneous offense evidence related to this deceased witness when the State did not express its intent to use the extraneous offense evidence until AFTER THE DEATH OF THE WITNESS and more than 3 years after charging appellant with the instant offense AND when appellant presented the witness and notarized statement concerning her potential testimony prior to even being formally charged?

4) Where the record will show that the absence of the deceased witness directly affected appellant's ability to testify, is definitive prejudice shown which would affect the prejudice factor in a Barker test?

5) Where Grand Jury Packet originally submitted by 1st Defense Counsel Doe Ray Rodriguez contained a defensive theory which shows the deceased witnesses testimony was necessary to present this theory, is prejudice not shown on the death of that witness and the inability of appellant to present a defensive theory?

6) Where the assertion of one's right to a speedy trial is at issue and Appellant filed a writ of mandamus seeking a higher court to compel the lower court to rule on a motion concerning speedy trial, one writ of mandamus seeking a higher court to compel the lower court to rule on a motion concerning speedy trial; but the weight given this factor by the Court in its review is downplayed considerably due to the failure of TRIAL-COUNSEL to assert the claim, would this finding be contrary to the Federal Court's determination of one's assertion of this right? considering appellant himself asserted this right time and again? and is this contrary to the law?

7) Where previous question(s) stand to reason that the prejudice factor or any other factor of the Barker test should be re-considered in this case, and no one factor of the Barker test should be considered singularly nor be given the weight of the test all its own without due consideration of the other factors because the weight in one factor can affect any of the other three, would it not be necessary for the Court to perform the Barker test all over again anew?

When the deceased witness was erroneously considered a witness for the State, despite being a defense witness, did this affect the prejudice factor in the Barker test?