1) Whether a sentencing judge can find facts in the first instance about whether
a defendant committed offenses on different occasions by a preponderance of
the evidence, and then rely on those judge-found facts to apply the Armed
Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), thereby increasing a
defendant's sentence at least five years beyond the penalty established by
Congress for the offense of conviction, being a felon in possession of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)?

2) Where the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA includes the limiting
language "against the person of another," is that language mere surplusage or
must a defendant be more than negligent as to whether his intentional conduct
could harm another?

3) Whether, when determining whether a state offense qualifies as a violent
felony, a federal court is bound by the decision of the state's highest court to
label a mens rea as something greater than negligence when this Court has
unequivocally established that the same mens rea under federal law
constitutes mere negligence?

Whether a sentencing judge can find facts about a defendant's prior offenses