1. Is it at least debatable whether Petitioner was improperly denied the right to amend his federal habeas corpus petition to include a claim that he is intellectually disabled, where, exactly as in Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. _ (2019) (Moore I), he has IQ test scores below 75, proof of adaptive deficits, and proof of onset of his disability before age eighteen?

2. Is it at least debatable whether a death-sentenced petitioner, on the basis of purported "delay," may be denied leave to amend his federal habeas petition with an intellectual-disability claim, when he moved to amend his petition before this Court even issued Moore II and the retroactive decisions in Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. (2017) (Moore J), and Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014)?

3. Is it at least debatable whether a petitioner who is actually innocent of the death penalty under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), is entitled to an equitable exemption from the statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)?

4. Is it at least debatable whether Petitioner, who was sentenced to death before Atkins, has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in litigating a post-conviction claim of intellectual disability—as has been held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012), and a dissenting judge in Petitioner's own case—particularly when defendants in his jurisdiction who have been sentenced to death after Atkins do have a right to raise their counsel's ineffective assistance in litigating an intellectual-disability claim?

Whether Petitioner was improperly denied the right to amend his federal habeas corpus petition to include a claim that he is intellectually disabled