I. WHETHER THE GOVERNING PROVISIONS IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT CASE LAW, IN RE GODDARD, 170 F.3d 43541999), HAS UNLAWFULLY CREATED AN ARBITRARY OR AMBIGUOUS APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. §2255 (h), THAT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE:
(a) To automatically dismiss a defaulted petition for a direct appeal, pursuant to §2244(B) (3)(a) based solely on the governing provisions in Goddard"iiarbitraxily defining thaf petition as a second or successive §2255. motion 'iwhich erroneously triggered the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. §2255 (h);
(b) In light of a conflict with the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Flores, 120 S.Ct. 1029, that mandates the automatic vacatur and remand of a petition to reinstate a direct appeal, When a court fails to conduct a circumstance-specific inquiry before making any ruling on the petition; and
(c) In light of a conflict with the Supreme Court decision in Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, that mandates a circumstance-specific inquiry as to whether extra ordinary circumstances existed, in the petition, In order to warrant the waiver, forfeiture, or equitable tolling of any procedural or provisional violations.

II. WHETHER A DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO FILE A PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED MOTION TO REINSTATE A DIRECT; JAPPEAL, PURSUANT TO ROE v. FLORES, F20, S.Ct. 102942000), USING A §2255 PETITION,'WITHOUT TRIGGERING' THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF §2255 (h) ?

Whether the governing provisions in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent case law, In re Goddard, has unlawfully created an arbitrary or ambiguous application of 28 U.S.C. §2255(h)