I. Whether the definition of "sex offense" in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) includes federal offenses other than those listed in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) (iii).

II. Whether courts must apply a categorical approach or circumstance-specific approach to determine if an offense is "a specified offense against a minor" under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii) and 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7).

III. In answering the second question, whether courts must afford deference under Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute in the National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008), otherwise known as the SMART Guidelines.

Whether SORNA's definition of 'sex offense' includes federal offenses not listed in § 20911(5)(A)(iii)