1. Where a defendant pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prior to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2029), and it is undisputed that the plea was neither knowing nor voluntary because he was not told that knowledge-of-status is a crucial element of the offense, is such a plea entered in clear violation of the Due Process Clause reversible error per se, or must a defendant prove that he would not have pled had he been advised of the knowledge-of-status element?

2. Does a state robbery offense that may be committed by putting the victim "in fear" — which is judged by an objective "reasonable person" standard, and does not require proof that the offender subjectively intended to put the victim "in fear" — "have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" as is necessary for an offense to qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Whether a guilty plea entered without knowledge of the knowledge-of-status element is reversible error per se