In McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants a right to "autonomy" that permits them to "maintain innocence" and precludes their lawyers from concedin g to "criminal acts" over their objection. Id. at 1509. Defendants have the right "to avoid * * * the opprobrium that comes with admitting" criminal acts and "to make fundamental choices about [their] own defense." Id. at 1508, 1511. Since McCoy was decided, federal and state courts have struggled to define the contours of the right to autonomy. A minority, including the Second Circuit in the decision below, has held that this right is violated only when an attorney unilaterally concedes guilt ; here, the Second Circuit affirmed the petitioner's murder-for-hire conviction where his lawyer conceded, over his ob jection, that he ordered his associates to shoot (but not kill) the victim. Other courts have held that a lawyer may not unilaterally concede any element of an offense—even elements like the location of the crime. A third group of courts has taken a middle approach, holding that the right to autonomy encompasses certain elements of an offense, like the actus reus , but not elements that are arguably less central to a conviction. Finally, courts are split on the types of cases that implicate McCoy ; some, but not others, have limited it to the capital context.

The question presented is: Does an attorney violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to autonomy by admitting , over the defendant's objection, that the defendant ordered a shooting of the victim, thereby conceding the actus reus of the crime?

Does an attorney violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to autonomy by admitting, over the defendant's objection, that the defendant ordered a shooting of the victim, thereby conceding the actus reus of the crime?