I. In this civil malicious prosecution claim, is it error to replace the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause as to the reliability of a witness' purported identification of the Plaintiff with the Eleventh Circuit's presumption, that a "co-defendant's" identification of another is credible and shows probable cause of Plaintiff's participation, where the totality shows it was highly likely only one person committed the crime, and where the presumption imported into civil cases, derives from post-conviction challenges to guilt and identification by guilty co-defendants, under Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030, 1044 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), where under the challenged presumption the "co-defendant's" identification of Plaintiff is reversed only when "incredible or [it] contradicts known facts to such an extent no reasonable officer would believe it?" (App. at 71).

II. Whether under the totality of the circumstances the Eleventh Circuit clearly misapprehended the summary judgment standard erroneously preventing a jury trial on Petitioner's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, predicated on the principles from Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that probable cause, for identification, cannot be based on fabricated evidence, where qualified immunity was granted to Respondent Heise on arguable probable cause?

Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying a presumption of credibility to a co-defendant's identification of the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution claim, instead of the Fourth Amendment's totality of the circumstances test for probable cause