Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc., et al. v. Village of Pomona, New York, et al.
SocialSecurity Takings JusticiabilityDoctri
When it enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc, et seq. , Congress created a cause of action
allowing a claimant to "obtain appropriate relief against
a government." Id. § 2000cc-2(a). Congress expressly
directed that standing "to assert a claim" "shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III
of the Constitution." Id. The Second Circuit below, as have
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, looked beyond those
general rules of standing under Article III, and, relying
on other considerations, concluded that the Petitioners lacked standing to assert RLUIPA claims arising under
the Substantial Burdens provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc(a), as well as claims arising under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. In doing so, the Second Circuit entered
a decision in conflict with decisions of the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.
Whether, under RLUIPA's Substantial Burdens
provision, an owner of real property seeking to use such
property for religious exercise has Article III standing
to challenge a municipality's zoning law that prohibits
outright the owner's proposed land use without first being required to either apply for permits or variances that the
municipality has no power to grant or to seek a legislative
change to the zoning law from the municipality?
Whether an owner of real property has Article III standing to challenge a municipality's zoning law that prohibits the owner's proposed religious land use without first applying for permits or variances that the municipality cannot grant or seeking a legislative change to the zoning law