Whether a criminal defendant's legitimate, untainted property is subject to an extra-statutory forfeiture money judgment or substitute property forfeiture (under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)), particularly when the defendant himself never "actually acquired" the tainted property (i.e., the laundered funds "involved in such offense," 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)), see Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1635 (2017), and all of the tainted property was returned to its rightful owner (the victim of the offense) before sentencing.

(1) Whether a district court can impose a forfeiture money judgment against a criminal defendant in the absence of any statutory authority;

(2) Whether the Court's holding in Honeycutt v. United States—that criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) of drug "proceeds the person obtained" is "limited to [tainted] property the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime" (i.e., no joint and several liability), 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1635 (2017)—likewise limits criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) to the tainted property "involved in" the money laundering offense that "the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime"; and

(3) Whether returning tainted property (i.e., the laundered funds "involved in such offense," 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)) to the rightful owner of the property (i.e., the victim of the offense) before sentencing is a "transfer[] ... to ... a third party," 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)(B) (emphasis added), that triggers forfeiture of a defendant's untainted, substitute property in an equivalent amount.

Whether a criminal defendant's legitimate, untainted property is subject to an extra-statutory forfeiture money judgment or substitute property forfeiture (under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p))