1st Question.
Whether this Court's Lexmark test is the sole
determinant of the statutory power of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board to adjudicate a § 1064 to
cancel a trademark registration, or can the Federal
Circuit's make its "real interest" and "reasonable
belief" approach an optional, more lenient to plead
for the statutory remedy.
Whether the Federal Circuit panel erred in its
decision (i) that does not adhere to this Court's
Lexmark precedent, and (ii) th at also conflicts with
the Fourth Circuit's decision on the interpretation
and application of the same statutory standard that
applies to pleading for the remedy created in Section
§ 1064 of the Lanham Act.
2nd Question.
Can the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
an Article I administrative tribunal, endow itself
with "inherent authority," not conferred by rule or
statute, and use that to impose a punitive sanction
on a party.
If the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board can
impose a punitive terminating sanction, for reasons
unrelated to trademark registerability, then must that administrative tribunal provide at least the
same due process protections as an Article III court.

Whether the Lexmark test is the sole determinant of the TTAB's statutory power to adjudicate a § 1064 trademark cancellation, or if the Federal Circuit's 'real interest' and 'reasonable belief' approach can be an optional, more lenient standard