Petitioner was sentenced to death after the State presented extensive evidence from his court ordered mental exam by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist. But, unlike in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), and Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87 (2013), Petitioner had not placed his mental state directly in issue by asserting a "mental-status defense." He did not claim that he had a mental disease or defect or that he suffered from any mental impairment which caused him to lack capacity to appreciate the criminality of the subject conduct.

Instead, Petitioner presented a mitigation case focused on his reduced moral culpability due to his abusive childhood and troubling family history. Two psychologists explained that mitigation theory in the context of widely accepted research in their profession, including that abuse is known to negatively affect children's developing brains. The State's psychiatrist purported to rebut Petitioner's mitigation with video of the mental exam and his opinions that Petitioner has "antisocial personality disorder" and is "evil" and "depraved."

Three issues are presented:

1. When a capital defendant intends to present mitigation evidence from mental health experts who have interviewed him, but affirmatively represents to the court that he will not present any mental-status or diminished-mental-capacity defenses at either the guilt or penalty phase, does a court order which compels that defendant to participate in a mental exam by a prosecution retained psychiatrist unconstitutionally force him to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to protect his rights to a thorough mitigation investigation and an individualized sentencing determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments?

2. Does the admission of testimony from the State's psychiatrist, including video clips from Petitioner's compelled mental examination, violate Petitioner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when Petitioner did not place his mental condition directly in issue, in either the guilt or penalty phase, and other sufficient means of rebuttal were available?

3. Even assuming arguendo that a capital defendant may in some circumstances be compelled to participate in a court-ordered mental examination by a State psychiatrist to rebut a defense expert who will testify only in the penalty phase, did the trial court nevertheless violate the capital defendant's constitutional rights to due process, to a fair trial, against compelled self-incrimination, and to an individualized sentencing determination when it permitted the prosecution to exceed the scope of the limited rebuttal purpose which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Cheever establish as the constitutional ceiling for such rebuttal mental health testimony?

When a capital defendant intends to present mitigation evidence from mental health experts who have interviewed him, but affirmatively represents to the court that he will not present any mental-status or insanity defenses, does a court order compelling the defendant to participate in a mental exam by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist unconstitutionally force him to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination?