New York State Courts have consistently annulled determinations of administrative agencies that terminated the employment of competitive class civil service employees from a Civil Service Law Section 75 disciplinary proceeding, where the procedures of Civil Service Law Section 75 were not complied with in the course of that termination from service.

On March 2, 2015, Ms. Castro was served with charges and specifications under New York Civil Service Law Section 75. But no hearing was held to determine the charges and specifications and no facts or findings were ever made by a hearing officer pursuant to that law; nor was any record of a disciplinary proceeding made; except for the serving of the charges. Nonetheless, thirty days after being served with the charges and specifications, and on April 2, 2015, Ms. Castro's employment was terminated based on the charges and specifications made against her.

1. The question presented is whether the Second Circuit's holding that Ms. Castro's "termination was based entirely on allegations of job-related misconduct," is consistent with the rule set by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Wiggins v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 385, 388-89 (1983), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

New York Courts have consistently held that a competitive class civil service employee has lawfully achieved tenure in their position where that employee satisfactorily completed the minimum period of probationary service set forth in a County's rules promulgated under Civil Service Law Section 63, and where that employee was not given notice that the minimum period of probationary service would continue to the maximum period of probationary service set forth in the County Rule.

Ms. Castro satisfactorily completed the prescribed two-month minimum period of probationary service set forth in the Personnel Rules and Regulations of the City of New York (55 RCNY, Appendix A; hereinafter, "PRR") without notice being given to her that the minimum period of probationary service would continue to the maximum period of probationary service.

2. The question presented is whether the Second Circuit's affirmance of the District Court's holding that Ms. Castro did not achieve tenure upon her satisfactory completion of the two-month minimum period of probationary service, is consistent with the rule set by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526 (1975)?

New York Courts have consistently annulled determinations of administrative agencies where removal of a competitive class civil service employee was effected by a person whom did not possess the power to appoint and remove, and have declared that the power to appoint and remove is a nondelegable statutory power conferred on an appointing authority.

Ms. Castro's civil service employment was terminated by a person whom did not possess the power under law to appoint and remove and whom was not the appointing authority: Defendant Dina Simon.

3. The question presented is whether the manner by which Ms. Castro's employment was terminated, is in violation of the rule set by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Simpson v. Wolansky, 38 N.Y.2d 391 (1975), its progeny, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Whether the Second Circuit's holding that Ms. Castro's termination was based entirely on allegations of job-related misconduct is consistent with the rule set by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Wiggins v. Board of Educ. and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment