I. The parties to a case cannot manufacture federal subject-matter jurisdiction by stipulation. Nonetheless, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq., purports to give the Executive Branch the power to "conclusively" determine that federal jurisdiction exists based on assumed, rather than established, facts. Does the MDLEA violate Article III and the Sixth Amendment by giving dispositive weight to the Executive Branch's assertion that jurisdiction exists?

II. The government argued to the jury, over objection, that the defendants' silence at arrest was evidence of their guilt. The circuit courts are divided over whether the Fifth Amendment bars the government from relying on a defendant's custodial silence, but they do not consider this Court's evidentiary holding barring such silence from federal trials. Did the Eleventh Circuit err in allowing evidence of custodial silence?

III. Rather than applying this Court's precedents, the Eleventh Circuit held that its "prior panel rule" precluded it from reaching appellant's arguments. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, which follows stare decisis, the Eleventh Circuit deems its panel decisions unassailable, even by arguments never before considered. Does Article III give federal judges the power to decree that panel decisions are binding and preclusive?

IV. This Court has held that it is "patently unconstitutional" to impose a longer prison sentence on a defendant solely because he exercised his trial right. The district court denied a downward variance solely because the accused refused to plead guilty. Did the sentence violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Does the MDLEA violate Article III and the Sixth Amendment by giving dispositive weight to the Executive Branch's assertion that jurisdiction exists?