I. Whether the definition of "felony drug offense" for the pur poses of 21 U.S.C. §851 is void for vaguene ss after Johnson, Dimaya, and Da vis.

II. Whether a defendant should be penalized – by the impositio n of the plain error standard of review on app eal – where he failed to assert his §851 rights, if the court never info rmed him of those rights – SPLIT IN CIRCUITS.

III. Whether, assuming arguendo th at the prior "felony drug of fense" definition is not voi d for vagueness, Petitioner is nonetheless entitled to resentencing due to the court's failure to abide by the dictate s of §851(b).

IV. Whether the inclusion of a juror who did not live in the j udicial district or state where the offense occu rred violated Petitioner's statu tory and Sixth Amendment rights.

IV. Whether the use of Petitione r's prior conviction to increa se the mandatory minimum sentence violat ed the Fifth and Sixth Amendme nts, where the indictment did not a llege the prior conviction and th e jury did not find it beyond a reasonable doubt.

VI. Whether Petitioner had been 'sentenced' within the meaning of the First Step Act before the appeals c ourt affirmed his sentence.

Whether the definition of 'felony drug offense' for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. §851 is void for vagueness