1. DNA evidence played a central role in this sexual assault case, in the form of a "match" between DNA from a complaining witness and the major contributor in DNA mixtures found on the fly of Petitioner's pants. This evidence was conveyed to the jury by state forensic analyst Elaine Taylor. However, concerns over Taylor's personnel record arose while direct appeal was pending, and the state appellate court remanded to the district court which held a remarkable two-day hearing in camera and ex parte on the matter. Although defense counsel were excluded from this hearing, the transcript and exhibits were made available to defense counsel, but not to the defense expert DNA witness. The prosecutor at trial misrepresented the DNA evidence during closing arguments. The question presented for review is:

What is the standard of materiality applicable in assessing the prejudicial impact of potential exculpatory evidence relating to the State's chief forensic expert which was obtained in a secret ex parte hearing at which defense counsel were excluded entirely, and thereafter precluded from sharing the results of which with the defense DNA expert?

2. This case stemmed from initial counts in one incident involving alleged forcible oral sodomy and procurement of lewd exhibition, but ballooned to a total of thirty-six counts ranging from burglary in the first degree to stalking to rape, alleged by thirteen different complaining witnesses against a police officer. Petitioner has alleged improper joinder. The question presented is:

Is there a constitutional limit on joinder of complaining witnesses and counts?

What is the standard of materiality applicable in assessing the prejudicial impact of potential exculpatory evidence relating to the State's chief forensic expert which was obtained in a secret ex parte hearing at which defense counsel were excluded entirely, and thereafter precluded from sharing the results of which with the defense DNA expert?