I. whether the district court erred when it improperly limited the scope of cross-examination of the jail house informant, thereby denying Mr. Anderson his constitutional right to confrontation.

II. Whether the district court reversibly erred in admitting highly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence describing uncharged, worse crimes, thereby denying Mr. Anderson his Constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury trial.

III. whether the district court reversibly erred when it denied Mr. Anderson's motion for mistrial after allowing inadmissible testimony from a Habitual Felon describing uncharged worse crimes, thereby denying mr. Anderson his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury trial.

IV. Whether the Division reversibly erred when it affirmed the district court's decision to not allow sufficient cross examination of the jail house witness as constitutional harmless error. Whether the trial error impacted the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

V. whether the Division reversibly erred when it failed to address the constitutionality of the "uncharged, worse crimes" argument.

VI. whether the Division reversibly erred when it stated falsely:

1. The record overwhelmingly supports the prosecution's case and lacks support for defendant's assertions.

2. There was no error in the proceedings. Without error, there was no reason to declare a mistrial.

3. We presume, absent a showing of actual prejudice.

VII. Whether the Division reversibly erred when it concluded there was no prejudice to allowing a habitual felon to commit perjury in the form of a fabricated false confession that incorporated a "fictitious roofie" allegation, thereby denying Mr. Anderson his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury trial, equal protection of the law, and due process of law.

VIII. whether the Division reversibly erred when it validated two essential elements of alleged crime, "Knowledge" and "Physically Helplessness," based upon not-true, "made-up false confession statements" by a habitual felon, that Mr. Anderson never confessed to. Whether this violates constitutional rights to counsel, protections against self-incrimination, and due process of law.

IX. whether the District Court reversibly erred when it ruled that defense counsel opened the door to the text messages, when he did not open the door. whether this violates fair and impartial trial rights.

X. Whether a verdict can constitutionally stand, where a jury is deprived of trial factual evidence, that Mr. Anderson has never pointed a gun at anyone in his life time, leaving the jury to speculate the possibility of a "roofie" role for their verdict. Whether this is unconstitutional, and violates principles of U.S. law, and violates fundamental fairness of law.

XI. Whether a partial acquittal gives the court authority to utilize false, inadmissible evidence. whether the courts are individual and separate, meaning whether a partial acquittal on one count specifically authorizes use of inadmissible, false evidence on a second count. Whether the second count conviction is therefore constitutionally permissible, or if it violates constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury trial.

Whether the district court erred in limiting the scope of cross-examination of a jailhouse informant, denying the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation