I. How should a court apply the "reasonable probability" test for prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), to a defendant who rejects a plea agreement and chooses to go to trial based on his counsel's incorrect advice about the elements of the offense and presents a legally nonexistent defense based on that advice and an alternative complementary defense?

II. Is this Court's test for prejudice under Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), satisfied when a defendant rejects a plea agreement and chooses to go to trial based on his counsel's incorrect advice about the elements of the offense and presents a legally nonexistent defense based on that advice and an alternative complementary defense?

How should a court apply the 'reasonable probability' test for prejudice under Strickland v. Washington and Lafler v. Cooper to a defendant who rejects a plea agreement and chooses to go to trial based on his counsel's incorrect advice about the elements of the offense and presents a legally nonexistent defense based on that advice and an alternative complementary defense?