Whether if was prejudicial error for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by disregarding review of essential elements at 18 U.S.C.§2251(a), in conflict with Supreme Court doctrine under Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); and to rely solely on "circumstantial evidence of a substantial step" pointed toward "sexting" behavior, but not pointed toward the charged offense?

I. The Supreme Court is needed to settle a recognized conflict between the Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning criminal liability and procedures at 18 U.S.C.§2422(b) and to define a term.

II. The Tenth Circuit decision below conflicts with a recent state supreme court decision on the important question: whether evidence of the behavioral theory of "grooming" requires a foundational showing of scientific validity to be admissible and relevant to a jury? The Supreme Court is needed to settle the conflict and to decide, in light of Oregon v Henley, 363 Or 284 (2018), whether the federal court abdicated its gatekeeping function under Daubert v Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 119 S Ct 1167 (1999), by allowing a fact witness' erroneous definition to materially influence the jury?

III.

Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in disregarding review of essential elements at 18 U.S.C.§2251(a) and relying solely on circumstantial evidence