Michael Herrold v. United States
1. Where a state statute explicitly defines "burglary"
in a way that does not require proof of an intent to commit
a crime, and thus lacks an element necessary to satisfy the
Armed Career Criminal Act's generic definition of "burglary," 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is that facial overbreadth
enough to demonstrate that the crime is non-generic, or
must a federal defendant also prove that the state has convicted someone who did not, in fact, harbor that intent?
2. The ACCA defines "serious drug offense" to include
state offenses "involving manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance
(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802))." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis
added). Does a state offense "involv[e]" distribution of a
"controlled substance" where it prohibits a bare offer to
sell drugs, even where the suspect has no drugs, no intent
to sell drugs, and no ability to obtain drugs?
Where a state statute explicitly defines 'burglary' in a way that does not require proof of an intent to commit a crime, and thus lacks an element necessary to satisfy the Armed Career Criminal Act's generic definition of 'burglary,' is that facial overbreadth enough to demonstrate that the crime is non-generic, or must a federal defendant also prove that the state has convicted someone who did not, in fact, harbor that intent?