The federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes proscribe material misrepresentations. The circuits are divided over the standard for proving materiality in federal fraud prosecutions involving a private (as opposed to a government) victim. For private victims, three circuits have held that a misrepresentation is material only if it could influence the decision of the actual decisionmaker to which the misrepresentation was made. In contrast, six circuits have held that a misrepresentation is material as long as it could influence the decision of a hypothetical "reasonable person."

The question presented is whether in a federal fraud prosecution involving a private victim materiality turns on the misrepresentation's ability to influence the actual decisionmaker to which it was made, or instead on its ability to influence a hypothetical "reasonable person".

Whether in a federal fraud prosecution involving a private victim, materiality turns on the misrepresentation's ability to influence the actual decisionmaker to which it was made, or instead on its ability to influence a hypothetical 'reasonable person'