James Milton Dailey v. Florida
Since being convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1987, Petitioner James Dailey has steadfastly maintained his innocence. No eyewitness, physical, or forensic evidence connected him to the crime. The State's case at trial hinged almost entirely on the testimony of jailhouse informants—none of whom surfaced until after a jury had already rejected a death sentence for Dailey's separately-tried codefendant, and the lead detective had combed Dailey's jail pod looking for new potential witnesses.
Recently, new evidence has been uncovered that not only critically undermines the jailhouse informant testimony against Dailey at trial, but also affirmatively points to Dailey's innocence. This new evidence includes a sworn confession by Dailey's codefendant, who is serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole, to being the sole perpetrator, thereby absolving Dailey of any involvement.
In the state postconviction proceedings below, Dailey sought relief based on his codefendant's 2017 confession. But the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court refused to permit any consideration of the confession as a matter of state hearsay law, notwithstanding this Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), which compels courts to admit reliable and material third-party statements, even if they would otherwise be barred on hearsay grounds.
Applying its own four-factor test for the analysis of Chambers claims, the Florida Supreme Court held that the codefendant's confession was properly deemed inadmissible under Chambers, "regardless of any corroborating evidence" that was or could be presented, because the confession was too recent, not spontaneous, and because the codefendant (who remains eligible for parole) invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the murder in open court.
Unless this Court intervenes, Dailey will face execution without any court having considered his codefendant's confession to being the sole perpetrator. The Florida Supreme Court's decision presents the following federal constitutional question for the Court's review:
Was the Florida Supreme Court's analysis of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), employing a factor-based approach that has been embraced by some courts but rejected by most others, unconstitutional?
Was the Florida Supreme Court's analysis of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), employing a factor-based approach that has been embraced by some courts but rejected by most others, unconstitutional?