1. By the exception of Martinez V. Ryan (32 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), Petitioner's inability to meet the one year time limitation under CAEDPA in Habeas corpus Proceedings is directly related to the lack of counsel assistance in Initial collate review (Rule 3) Proceedings, wherefore was this not adequate enough reason for U.S. District court to have excused procedural default.

2. Did the Arkansas supreme court err in not granting Petitioner's timely filed motion for extension of time, violating his 14 Amendment to due Process for he made it aware he was ill equipped, selling a copy of his transcript and motion of discovery, thus having to act abstractly, due to ineffective assistance stemming from non ICH.

3. Should petitioner not have been granted relief in U.S. District court and resentenced in accord with AR.ST. 16-93-621(c)(a), of the "Fair sentencing of Minors Act OF 2017" ACT 539, S.B. 294, thus making his current sentence an excessive one, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, violating the 8 constitutional Amendment (Bail-Punishment. And should it not have been regarded as a rule in habeas corpus Proceedings by 28 U.S.C. 1652, State laws as rules of decision, and established as a new rule by Teague V. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

4. Does 28 U.S.C. 1658(a) not make allowance for the challenge of the "Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017" to have been ruled timely in habeas corpus proceedings.

Whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the district court failed to adequately address his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255