1. The state habeas testimony of Michael Nance's trial counsel established that they inexplicably omitted highly mitigating evidence from Mr. Nance's capital sentencing trial that they themselves regarded as pivotal to their chosen mitigation strategy. The question presented is: Are courts permitted to deem trial counsel's omissions strategic and reasonable without consideration of the record, as the Eleventh Circuit did here, or must a court instead look to the record evidence in determining the reasonableness of trial counsel's actions, as the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have all held?

2. The State used a 50,000-volt, remote-activated stun belt to restrain Mr. Nance throughout his entire capital trial, though no particularized security risk justified its use. Mr. Nance made clear to the court that the belt interfered with his ability to confer with counsel and participate in his trial. The court nonetheless permitted the State to use the stun belt—not because the judge found a particularized need for it, but instead because he decided "to really leave that up to the sheriff's department to make that decision." The question presented is: Has this Court clearly established a general principle that state imposed courtroom practices that prejudice a capital defendant's constitutional trial rights must be justified by an essential state interest?

Whether courts must consider the record evidence in determining the reasonableness of trial counsel's actions, or can deem them strategic and reasonable without such consideration