KENDRA BRANTLEY:
I.
Was the D.C. Circuit's affirmance of Petitioner Brantley's convictions
erroneous and in conflict with other federal jurisdictions on the requirements of Fed.
Crim. R. P. 11 and the standard of review where, during Brantley's three attempts to
plead guilty, district court judges improperly interfered with the attorney/client
relationship, rejected language agreed to by both parties, insisted on language that
was not legally required, and repeatedly insisted that Brantley would be better off
going to trial; where one of three panel appellate judges agreed that the district court
"improperly usurped the role of defense counsel," and "[m]ore troubling," appeared to
advise Brantley not to plead guilty, Norman, Conc. Op. at 1-2 (J. Henderson,
concurring); and where there is a reasonable probability that had Petitioner been
permitted to plead guilty, her sentence would have been substantially lower.
II.
Did the D.C. Circuit's affirmance of the drug quantity calculation for
Petitioner Brantley violate due process and conflict with other federal jurisdictions
where the district court failed to make particularized findings as to the amount of
drugs reasonably foreseeable to Brantley, the record established and the district court
agreed that Brantley was a minor participant, and the resulting sentence is much
higher than what is permitted.
DEENVAUGHN ROWE:
III.
The District Judge denied Rowe's motion under Rule 29, Fed. R. Crim.
P., to dismiss the bribery and bribery conspiracy charges against him for the
Government's failure to present sufficient evidence. Was this error, in light of the
prosecution's failure to show a quid pro quo?
IV.
The Trial Judge and the Court of Appeals below artificially inflated
Petitioner's federal sentencing guidelines offense level by looking to his actions at the
local level in the underlying nationwide narcotics conspiracy. The question presented
by Rowe is whether the Court should require organizer-leader enhancements to be
calculated in such broadly-based prosecutions by evaluating each participant's
significance to the overall scheme?
ALICIA NORMAN:
V.
The Use of Acquitted Conduct At Norman's Sentencing Violated
Her Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process and Her
Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial

Was the D.C. Circuit's affirmance of Petitioner Brantley's convictions erroneous and in conflict with other federal jurisdictions on the requirements of Fed. Crim. R. P. 11 and the standard of review