Mr. Grenning's life sentence upon post-trial allegation of aggravating elements raises a significant issue: Integrity of appeals that circumvent Supreme Court authority on the Sixth Amendment right to Notice by use of 'straw man' arguments. Grenning was sentenced to 116 years using aggravators he received no notice of before trial, as only after trial ended did the State allege them. The habeas court ruled he had no right to receive aggravators in the charging document, recharacterizing the ground to a narrower 'federal indictment clause' claim Grenning never made. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's summary denial of Certificate of Appealability subject Grenning to a stricter standard than prescribed by the Supreme Court, when jurists of reason could disagree with the district court using a 'straw man' to knock down an appeal of a cornerstone Constitutional right?

Mr. Grenning's case raises a substantial question on the scope of Oregon v. Ice, when Washington and several other states paint this Court's ruling more broadly that its language holds: Does Oregon v. Ice grant as exempt from the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, all facts used for consecutive sentencing? Or is it the 'narrow exception' described by Justice Gorsuch in United States v. Haymond, and not applicable to consecutive sentencing that creates 'above-standard-range' discrete sentences? Washington's scheme, by statute, 'authorities, and in the record, is a "sentence above the standard range for each of the defendant's convictions." Did summary denial of COA by the Ninth Circuit subject Grenning to an unduly burdensome standard for granting COA, when jurists of reason could debate removing from the jury determination of facts supporting above-standard-range consecutive sentences, and the claim deserves encouragement to proceed further on appeal?

Mr. Grenning's life sentence upon post-trial allegation of aggravating elements