Could reasonable jurists disagree whether the District Court's refusal of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion before pre-trial trial, and Appellant counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce DNA evidence and false, material evidence into his trial ineffective, for allowing the Prosecution for misrepresented the evidence of the case for failure to call Alibi witness; for failure to object as when Petitioner used 2 Multimethods-proof- 1715 Bank robbery conviction (that was repeated, motioned out six occasions—through Appellant—adds validity), Petitioner did not take the stand to testify in the 2010 Bank robbery trial case such admission of continued as of civil law institutional improper and highly prejudicial, for failure to effectively direct Appeal, and point-out to the Eleventh Circuit that the District Court sinned the record that to admit testimonies 1995 and robbery on the Jury would be "conviction on" proof prejudicial, and that "the probative value is jury, to argue on add patient the Appeal) that the cumulative effect of as noted-causes deficiencies were not objective standards substantially notice; evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction and hence was was true; for failure to request a mistrial or to argue on a vote of reasonableness under Strickland and amounted to a revision norm violation of support error because the District Court refused to grant an Petitioners claim evidential hearing

Given Petitioner's credible evidence via the record, trial transcript, and supporting Affidavit, did the Eleventh Circuit err in ruling that he failed to voice a substantial showing of the denial of a Constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2)?

Whether the district court erred in rejecting the petitioner's claim within his § 2255 motion that pre-trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing the prosecution to present false material DNA evidence and false material evidence at his trial that misrepresented the evidence of the case, for failure to properly cross-examine witnesses, and for failure to argue on direct appeal and point out to the Eleventh Circuit that the district court stated on the record that admitting the petitioner's 1995 bank robbery conviction to the jury would be 'pretty prejudicial' and that 'the probative value is slight'