1. PETITIONER, LAGENZA JUNIOUS, ALLEGED THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE A DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER DUE TO HIS MENTAL DEFECT/ILLNESS, PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE THE APPROPRIATE MENS REA HE WAS INCAPABLE OF FORMULATING THE SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL BECAUSE PETITIONER FACULTIES WERE SO IMPAIRED AS THE RESULT OF INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

2. PETITIONER ALLEGED THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S RENDERED INEFFECTIVENESS CAUSE HIM TO ENTER AN INVOLUNTARY AND UNKNOWING, PETITIONER ONLY ENTER A PLEA DEAL WHEREIN PLEA COUNSEL WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE IF PETITIONER INSIST ON GOING TO TRIAL, THESE THREATS INDUCED THE PLEA, AND THE FIRST PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FILING A NO-MERIT LETTER BY NO'S? DEVELOPING THE FACTS OF THESE TWO ISSUES.

DID THE STATE SUPERIOR IN ITS OPINION OF PETITIONER SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IGNORES OR ERRED IN ITS FRAMING OF THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD UNDER THE CONTROLLING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, RENDERED A DECISION CONTRARY TO OR OBJECTION UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW?

Was the state superior court's decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel?