1. Was the evidence of Petitioner's identity as the shooter sufficient to sustain the first-degree murder conviction where that evidence consisted of (1) the testimony of an eyewitness that he selected Petitioner's photo only because Petitioner "looks almost like" the shooter, who did not identify Petitioner as the shooter at trial and, in fact, who testified that Petitioner differed from the shooter in five physical characteristics and that the shooter had been wearing a ski mask and a hood, and (2) a surveillance video showing that Petitioner left the Citgo gas station where the shooting occurred three minutes before the shooting wearing a white t-shirt and purple and pink shoes, and the same video shows the shooter appear three minutes later wearing a hoodie with black and white lettering and red shoes?

2. Was a juror's impartiality placed in reasonable doubt, in violation of Petitioner's Constitutional right to an impartial jury, where the juror said he had been the victim of a violent crime but never said he could set that experience aside and decide the case solely on the evidence?

3. Were the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated by the introduction of (1) evidence that the "Chedda Ave" street gang "controlled" the neighborhood, including the Citgo gas station where the shooting occurred, without any evidence that Petitioner or the victim were affiliated with any gang or that the shooting was gang related and (2) that Petitioner was a member of a rap music group (not a gang) named "Chedda Ave" that had a lyric "another body up at the Citgo and a music video with Petitioner dancing on the roof of the Citgo, without any evidence that the rap group had anything to do with the street gang or the shooting in this case?

4. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for (1) failing to move to suppress the eyewitness's selection of Petitioner's photograph and testimony that Petitioner only "looks almost like" the shooter, (2) failing to move to quash the bindover or for a directed verdict, (3) failing to rehabilitate or excuse the juror who said he had been the victim of a violent crime, and (4) failing to object to the admission of hearsay that the victim's family told someone that Petitioner told them that he heard that the victim's family was saying he was the shooter?

Was the evidence of Petitioner's identity as the shooter sufficient to sustain the first-degree murder conviction?