In Green v. United States , the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial of a greater
offense when the jury's "verdict was silent" on that
offense. 355 U.S. 184, 186, 190 –91 (1957). I n Richardson v. United States , the Court affirmed that the
hung jury rule permits retrial of an offense on which
the jury was unable to agree. 468 U.S. 317, 324
(1984).

Here, a jury convicted respondent, Philip Martin, of
second-degree murder. In its verdict, the jury stated
it was "unable to agree" on the greater, first -degree
murder charge. Martin successfully appealed, and
his conviction was reversed. On remand, the State
again sought —and obtained —a first-degree murder
conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the
conviction, holding the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred Martin's retrial for first -degree murder under
Green .

The question presented, upon which courts are d ivided, is:

When a jury expressly states it is "unable to agree"
on a defendant's guilt for a greater offense and co nvicts the defendant of a lesser offense, and the defendant successfully appeals his conviction, does the
hung jury rule permit retrial of the greater offense or
d
oes Green instead bar retrial of that offense?

When a jury expressly states it is 'unable to agree' on a defendant's guilt for a greater offense and convicts the defendant of a lesser offense, and the defendant successfully appeals his conviction, does the hung jury rule permit retrial of the greater offense or does Green instead bar retrial of that offense?