No. 19-5893
Melissa Pfeiffer v. Massachusetts
IFP
Tags: conscious-disregard-for-risk criminal-law felony-murder inherent-dangerousness inherently-dangerous inherently-dangerous-felony judicial-determination judicial-fact-finding jury-instructions malice-aforethought massachusetts-law presumption-of-malice sentencing
Latest Conference:
2019-11-08
Question Presented (from Petition)
Is it unconstitutional for the courts, as a matter of common law, to withdraw the third element of felony murder from the jury's consideration by labeling it a "question of law," where the judge's determination of that question requires a factual analysis, increases the authorized penalty above that permitted by the jury's verdict alone in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and imposes a conclusive presumption of intent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause?
Question Presented (AI Summary)
Whether the judge or the jury decides the issue of intent in a second-degree felony murder case where the underlying felony is inherently dangerous as a matter of law
Docket Entries
2019-11-12
Petition DENIED.
2019-10-24
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/8/2019.
2019-09-05
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due October 10, 2019)
Attorneys
Melissa Pfeiffer
Rebecca Ann Jacobstein — Committee for Public Counsel Services, Petitioner