In state habeas proceedings, Ramirez alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate for, develop and present evidence in support of his chosen theory of defense. The state court ordered counsel to submit an affidavit in response, but counsel blatantly ignored the order. The state court turned a blind eye, refused Ramirez's numerous requests to hold a hearing, and ultimately denied the claim without remark.

Ramirez reurged his claim in §2254 proceedings. The federal district court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and denied Ramirez a COA on the claim.

The Fifth Circuit also originally denied a COA, stating it could not "see a plausible basis for concluding that the state court was unreasonable in concluding no prejudice existed." Ramirez moved for reconsideration. The court found his arguments compelling and granted a COA on his claim.

Pursuant to §2254(d)(1), the state court's application of Strickland must be unreasonable for Ramirez to obtain federal habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) commands that an "unreasonable application" inquiry be objective, not subjective. And, Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) sets forth certain determinations a federal court must make in its inquiry.

But, the Fifth Circuit's order does not acknowledge Williams requirements. And, the entirety of its order gives no appearance or indication that it made an objective "unreasonable application" inquiry before concluding that the state court's decision was not unreasonable. Instead, its analysis and conclusion consisted of one lone, subjective sentence: "Having carefully considered the trial transcript, and given the substantial range of reasonable applications of the Strickland standard as well as the deference owed to the state habeas court's decision, we are not persuaded that Ramirez is entitled to relief under §2254(d)(1)."

The following questions are presented:

1. Was the Fifth Circuit's "unreasonable application" inquiry proper?

2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in concluding that the state court's application of the Strickland prejudice standard was reasonable?

Was the Fifth Circuit's 'unreasonable application' inquiry proper?