1) Procedural Default is the failure to follow state appellate procedures which bars
federal review of the case in the absence of showing cause for and prejudice from
the failure or sometimes in the absence of showing proof that the bar would result
in a miscarriage of justice. Defendant/Petitioner originally failed to follow state
appellate procedures to attack his underlying conviction. Nevertheless, seven years
after he completed his sentence, the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division/Fourth Department, agreed he showed good cause to allow him
to take a direct appeal from an improper procedure to attack his judgment of
conviction. (Appendix [A]: 2; Defendant's Pro Se Brief [DPSB]: 4, 6-9, 10;
People's Response to Pro Se Brief [PRPSB]: 3-5; Defendant's Pro Se Reply Brief
[DPSRB]: 3-5, 5-6, 7) The Court interpreted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Does this cause support good reason this should still continue to be deemed for
Defendant's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to
dismiss the underlying conviction by Coram Nobis?

2) Defendant/Petitioner alleged upon his arrest for rape in April, 2001, that his
accuser had a history of accusing other men of sex offenses. He provided for the
record that evidence existed his accuser had another man arrested in August, 2007,
for the same offense. He has obtained a statement from the other man she accused,
claiming he was accused by the same woman and he was innocent. (DPSB: 10)
Could this support relief pursuant to the rule of procedural default because it
proves Defendant/Petitioner is actually innocent?

Whether the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division/Fourth Department, erred in allowing Defendant/Petitioner to take a direct appeal from an improper procedure to attack his judgment of conviction seven years after he completed his sentence, despite his original failure to follow state appellate procedures which would have barred federal review of the case in the absence of showing cause for and prejudice from the failure or sometimes in the absence of showing proof that the bar would result in a miscarriage of justice.