Whether (as the Eleventh Circuit holds), under § 3161(d)(1), a "subsequent replacement indictment " "restarts the clock regardless of how the prior indictment was dismissed, " or (as others hold), "superseding " indictments are automatically excluded; collaterally, whether the words of art "subsequent " vis-a-vis "superseding " should be clarified in the context of § 3161(d)(1); and,

The judgments below automatically vacated due to plain errors self-evident from the record under S.Ct. Rule 24(l)(a), or otherwise, e.g., failure to reset the STA Clock and thereby violate the Speedy Trial Act-Clause, Indictment of a Grand Jury Clause, Due Process Clause and Notice Clause, by docketing a § 3161(d)(1) indictment without acknowledging the reset concomitant 30/70 Day STA Clock, as required by § 3161(d)(1), and by U.S. v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (1985), where two Supreme Court Justices concurred that, "the 30-day and 70-day periods were intended to operate in tandem "; as well as, Constructive amendment of that constitutionally-insufficient [subsequent] indictment, by broadening the charges at trial, thereby circumventing the 5th Amendment Indictment of a Grand Jury Clause, among other plain errors.

Whether a 'subsequent replacement indictment' restarts the Speedy Trial Act clock or if 'superseding' indictments are automatically excluded