John Beyers was sentenced in part, under a statute held unconstitution, 18 USC § 3583(k). Rather than wait until this court's ruling in Haymond, as the government suggested, both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit speedily dismissed the case before Haymond issued and without addressing the substantive objections to release.

1. In light of the Eighth Circuit's consistent practice of failing to give consideration to pro se applicants, often declining opportunity to brief why a certificate should issue, does 28 USC § 2253 process unconstitutionally dilute the writ, by removing even the modest review available under common law?

2. Do those on supervised release have the same diminished expectation of privacy as those on probation or parole, or do the "differences of constitutional significance" affect this expectation?

3. As a revocation of supervised release "adjusts" the original term of imprisonment, allowing imposition of "punishment" for one offense in multiple proceedings, does this violate a released! Is legitimate expectation of finality? Given the inability of the case law to coherently and consistently define the scope and purpose of release, is jlurther guidance needed?

4. Can a releasee be forced, under the guise of "therapy" into the Hobson's choice of waiving constitutional rights, including self incrimination, or of losing his freedom? May courts use therapy as a backdoor to impose constitutionally questionable conditions?

5. Should a GVR issue in light of United States v Haymond, No. 17-1672 (2019), to have the Eighth Circuit address its impact on Beyers' challenge to release and his sentence?

6. Is the holding of Dean v United States, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017) limited to §924(c) or is its guidance on sentencing with multiple counts widely applicable?

Whether the 28 USC § 2253 process unconstitutionally dilutes the writ of habeas corpus by removing even the modest review available under common law