The VCAR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), contains two "motive" elements, only one of which applies to Petitioner's case. To prove this element, Respondent was required to show Petitioner committed the murder in aid of racketeering offense as "consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from" the indicted RICO enterprise. At Petitioner's trial, Respondent elicited neither direct evidence nor circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn, to prove this motivational element.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the "enterprise profits" theory of pecuniary-gain motivation to conclude Respondent shouldered its burden. This theory satisfies the motive element by focusing on whether some of the individuals involved in the VCAR offense were RICO enterprise members, as opposed to whether Petitioner's paymaster was an enterprise member.

Does the application of the "enterprise profits" theory stretch the application of the VCAR statute far beyond what Congress intended and federalize a state murder case?

Does the application of the 'enterprise profits' theory stretch the application of the VCAR statute far beyond what Congress intended and federalize a state murder case?