Where sentencing is imposed based on misinformation of constitutional magnitude regarding the import of the defendant's criminal record, did the Ninth Circuit's deviation from this Court's standard in Tucker, by requiring more than evidence that the sentence "might have been different" if the judge had the correct information, result in an unconstitutionally unreliable sentence in violation of due process of law?

In any event, should the Court grant the writ, vacate the denial of relief, and remand for the district court to apply the due process standard to the facts of the case because, in the absence of any explanation from the sentencing judge, the Ninth Circuit should have remanded to permit the trial court to make the missing findings in the first instance under this Court's precedent prioritizing the district court's role in making initial factual determinations and presuming prejudice from Guidelines errors?

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in requiring more than evidence that the sentence 'might have been different' to establish a due process violation under United States v. Tucker