1. In three circuits, pattern jury instructions extend Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)) to an offense committed by causing fear of harm to intangible property. Because fear of economic harm can be caused without the use or threat of violent force, is Hobbs Act robbery categorically a "crime of violence" under the "force clause" of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)?

2. Whether the new rule of constitutional law set out in Johnson v. United States and held to be retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review by this Court in Welch v. United States applies to the definition of crime of violence in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)?

Whether Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)