In Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296, the Court observed that an apparent objective of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., is preserving creditors' judicial remedies, "but the term ['creditor'] does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another." § 1692a(4). Congress distinguishes and includes debts either owed or due another, § 1692a(6). Respondent Bank Of New York Mellon, As Trustee For CIT Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1, is a self-proclaimed trustee.

The first question is whether a trustee such as respondent that receives assignment or transfer of a debt, as trustee for beneficial interest holders solely to bring a foreclosure action, can qualify as a person facilitating collection "for another" within the defined exclusion to the term "creditor" in § 1692a(4).

The second question is whether the lower court's rule that "the filing of an action to foreclose is a necessary precedent to reaching a postjudgment judicial remedy, so communications with a court that are necessary to maintain that foreclosure action do not violate § 1692c(b)" renders § 1692i(b) and § 1692c(b)'s exception "or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy," and particularly the word "postjudgment" superfluous, void, or insignificant.

Whether a trustee that receives assignment or transfer of a debt, as trustee for beneficial interest holders solely to bring a foreclosure action, can qualify as a person facilitating collection 'for another' within the defined exclusion to the term 'creditor' in § 1692a(4)