A. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896), the
Court addressed the so-called "political offense"
exception to extradition, relating the phrase to actions
committed at or about a time revolutionary activity
was in progress. Since then, lower courts have limited
the exception to war-like insurrections. Given the
present state of international turmoil, which includes
acts of terrorism and violence on every possible scale,
the Court needs to provide a modern working definition
of the phrase and the principles necessary to apply the
political offense doctrine to the realities of today's
world. The question presented therefore asks whether
the Seventh Circuit has correctly construed the
"political offense" exception to extradition by limiting
the term only to offenses committed in the midst of
war-like violent insurrections.

B. Prior Seventh Circuit precedent permitted the
District Court deny an extradition request where
"exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist
because of particularly atrocious procedures or
punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction." See
In re Burt , 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984). The
panel in the instant case noted that Munaf v. Geren ,
553 U.S. 674 (2008), cast doubt "on the continuing
validity or at least the scope of Burt 's constitutional
and humanitarian limitations." The panel avoided
deciding the issue by assuming Burt 's continuing
validity but ruling that petitioner failed to show
specific atrocious procedures or punishments that
would justify denying extradition anyway. The question
for review asks whether Munaf v. Green overruled the
Seventh Circuit precedent and, if it did not, asks the
Court to address the scope of review when the subject
of an extradition request makes a claim of atrocious
conditions or punishments.

C. Ultimately the Secretary of State makes the
final decision with respect to extradition. In the
instant case petitioner received a letter from an
Assistant Legal Advisor for Law Enforcement and
Intelligence in the United States Department of State
who stated, without elaboration, that an Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs had authorized
her extradition. Two related questions are raised.
First there is a jurisdictional question of whether an
Under Secretary, or a Legal Advisor, had the authority
to sign off on the extradition decision. If that question
is answered affirmatively, the Court should grant
certiorari to decide whether the Secretary of State as
an entity must provide something more than a bareboned statement to satisfy its obligations when it
comes to extradition.

Whether the Seventh Circuit has correctly construed the 'political offense' exception to extradition by limiting the term only to offenses committed in the midst of war-like violent insurrections